




the liberal Contest for Double-Entry Bookkeeping in british government

Introduction
Although it was realised from the 15th century that double-entry bookkeeping (hereafter DEB) provided an important means by which merchants could manage increasingly complex businesses it was not until the 18th century that DEB began to find favour with governments. Amongst the earliest were the French who in 1716 “tried to reform its financial administration, using an attractive technical innovation: double-entry bookkeeping” (Lemarchand 1999, p. 226). Eventually, after the Revolution in 1789, double-entry bookkeeping was successfully introduced across most of the French Government (Nikitin 2001). The Portuguese Government also appreciated quite early the potential benefits of DEB for the purposes of government when they officially adopted it in 1761 (Gomes et al 2008), much earlier than reluctant British governments. In an important contribution to the study of the history of public sector accounting Edwards et al (2002) sought to explain this resistance to the introduction of DEB by the British by arguing that those who historically held power resisted any reforms which they perceived may have threatened their privileged position. This included a change in the form of government accounts and the purposes that this would serve which was perceived to have the potential to introduce new priorities in accountability which were more reflective of the values and demands of those who sought to challenge the status quo. Thus, Edwards et al (2002) suggest that the ultimate form which DEB took when implemented in British Government in the mid-19th century was the result of ideological conflict between the privileged landed aristocracy and the rising merchant middle class (Edwards et al 2002, Abstract, pp.637,638,642; Perkin 1969, p.44). Spence (2010, p.386) maintains that arguments over the accuracy or meaning of accounting figures do “not proceed on the grounds of some neutral technicism but on the underlying terrain of programmatic ambitions where irreconcilable ideologies collide with each other”. 

Edwards et al (2002) identify as particularly important in determining the form of DEB took in British Government the dysfunctional proceedings of the ‘Commission Appointed to Inquire into and to State the Mode of Keeping the Official Accounts in the Principal Departments Connected with the Receipt and Expenditure for the Public Service, etc’. The Commission, which was appointed in 1828 to investigate the possibility of introducing DEB throughout government departments, is seen by Edwards et al (2002) as a particularly prominent example of how members of the established order sought to prevent any changes to the administration and accountability of government which might threaten their social and political supremacy. The three Commissioners appointed to the Commission of Official Accounts included two career civil servants, Thomas Constantine Brooksbank and Samuel Beltz (hereafter B&B) and a public accountant, Peter Harriss Abbott. Brooksbank was a member of the Revenue Department of Treasury while Beltz was a member of the Civil Service Pay Office (TNA: ADM 106/1473​[1]​; see also Edwards et al, 2002, p. 645, Edwards and Greener 2003, p.56). 

Edwards et al (2002) contend that the Commission of Official Accounts became a “battleground” between the Commissioners as to whether “the mercantile system of double entry should be designed to reflect the “old society” priorities of stewardship, patronage and personal accountability or “new society” pressure for a business framework judged capable of achieving “cheap and efficient government”” (Edwards et al 2002, Abstract; see also Perkin 1969, p.176, Hammond and Foot 1965, p.27, Bellamy 1992, p.1). Edwards et al, conclude that the form of double-entry bookkeeping advocated by B&B was the one which was finally accepted by the government in 1829. This account, however, fails to recognise that before the accepted system of accounting could be implemented, Lord Grey’s Whig Government who were elected in 1830 rejected B&B’s accounting system in preference for one more closely attuned to commercial practice which had been in operation for some in the Navy Department.

There are two main contributions of the present study. Firstly, it exposes the “underlying terrain of programmatic ambitions” which determined that any contests over the introduction of DEB by the British Government were not primarily about a prosaic technique for recording and reporting transactions to strengthen the personal accountability of office-holders (see Edwards et al, 2002, p.650). The constitutional crises created by civil war and Revolution in England in the 17th century which threatened the power and very existence of Parliament determined that government accounting would provide primarily fundamental constitutional protections by the accountability of individual government officials. In contrast, reformers had a mission to implant the liberal ideological imperative of economy as the priority of government, a priority which was not confined to members of the rising merchant classes. In contrast to Edwards et al (2002), this study establishes that conflict and delay over the introduction of DEB cannot be mainly attributable to a rigid ideological dichotomy between the merchant and landed classes. Instead, the choice of the DEB system which was finally implemented was dependent upon the beliefs and commitment of key individuals from both the landed classes and the rising merchant classes, but most surprisingly the former without whom the introduction of DEB certainly would have been delayed until much later. 

The second major contribution of this study is recognition for the first time in the accounting and public sector literature of the importance of the civil servant John Deas Thomson in the acceptance of double-entry bookkeeping by the British Government. It was the DEB system developed by John Deas Thomson (hereafter Deas Thomson) which was finally approved by Lord Grey’s Whig Government soon after being elected in 1830. Deas Thomson’s DEB system had been operating since 1826 in various forms in the Navy as a trial system which ran in parallel with the then required cash based system of accounting. Despite numerous references in official publications, such as Hansard​[2]​ and reports by parliamentary committees, to both Deas Thomson and the DEB system he introduced in the biggest spending department of State, the Royal Navy (hereafter the Navy), neither Edwards et al (2002) nor Edwards and Greener (2003) refers to Deas Thomson. In the paper by Edwards and Greener (2003, p.61) “a Mr Thompson” (sic) is listed in a table as the person who installed DEB in the Navy but without any further details​[3]​.

The importance of key individuals and elite groups in driving change has been highlighted by institutional theorists and in the accounting history literature (Edwards et al, 2002, p.640; Edwards et al 2013; Bottomore 1964; Chambers 1997; Mills 1956; Nadel 1956). Gomes et al (2008, p.1150) refer to the “institutional entrepreneur” whose control of the necessary resources and access to ‘subsidiary actors’ enables them to influence institutionalised rules. This approach to the study of accounting history seeks to go behind the specifics of critical episodes in accounting history to access the motives, biases and enthusiasms of key participants and assess the impact of these on events. For Edwards et al (2002) this is achieved with their study of the relationship between B&B and Abbott and between the Commissioners and prominent political actors which, Edwards et al argue, reflected class based ideological differences that determined the form of DEB advocated. 

Understanding accounting as a social practice, not a set of neutral calculative practices devoid of the impetus, intolerance and biases of ideology is now recognised as a major accomplishment of critical accounting research over the past three decades (Morgan 1988; Spence 2010; Burchell et al 1980; Hoskin and Macve 1988). Much of the attention of critical accounting researchers has been directed towards the relationship between accounting and structures of power and influence in the modern capitalist state (Burchell et al 1980; Miller 1990; Loft 1986). In the service of elites accounting has been shown to be constitutive and reflective of their ambitions and ideologies, a product of a particular social reality and the means of promoting this reality by shaping social relations. Accounting involves “the communication of a set of values, of ideals, of expected behaviour, of what is approved and disapproved” (Roberts and Scapens 1985, p.448; see also Mouritsen in Quattrone 2000, p.134). Therefore, as this study confirms, accounting can play a highly influential role in institutionalising particular, privileged values and beliefs. Accountants are “subjective ‘constructors of reality’: presenting and representing the situation in limited and one-sided ways” (Morgan 1988, p.477, also p.480). By selectively giving visibility or emphasis to certain aspects and beliefs of society, accounting provides a powerful means to confer legitimacy on, and acceptance of, the priorities and beliefs, that is ideologies, of dominant social classes. This characteristic is often accentuated by the way in which the accepted purposes of accounting result in an exaggerated emphasis on accuracy which “precludes theoretical considerations of the actual purposes to which calculative practices are put” (Spence 2010, p.382). According to Miller (2001, p.382), the great strength and attractiveness of accounting to those who seek to promote particular interests and associated ideologies is the way in which the calculative practices of accounting can be easily accepted as “set apart from political interests and disputes, above the world of intrigue and beyond debate”.

Edwards et al accepted that their detailed account of the introduction of DEB in British Government and the ideological imperative they claimed in the conflict between the Commissioners might be challenged by “the location and study of relevant archival records” (Edwards et al 2002, p.638). The present study meets this expectation by drawing upon a neglected collection of documents preserved as part of the Grigg Family Papers​[4]​ located in London and the Thomson Papers held in the Mitchell Library in Sydney. It also draws heavily on evidence contained within the British National Archive, the National Maritime Museum and British Parliamentary Papers which has been overlooked by previous studies of the introduction of DEB. The new evidence provides an explanation of the conflict between B&B and Abbott which indicates that the ideological class based dimension proposed by Edwards et al (2002) was less a direct cause of the conflict, although it was present in the attitudes and behaviours that B&B and Abbott exhibited towards each other. This is especially obvious in the new material which reveals the critical, largely forgotten, role played by Deas Thomson in DEB being adopted by the British Government. 

After a review of liberal theory the paper identifies how liberal beliefs became the most important influence in British political and social life from the late 18th century. This is followed by a discussion of the earliest form of DEB in the Navy which had been developed and trialled by Deas Thomson and the entrenched resistance that he encountered in getting it accepted as the official form of accounts. A detailed examination of the appointment and work of the Commission of Official Accounts in 1828, in particular the destructive conflict between the Commissioners, identifies the competing values and interests which were embedded in the accounting systems that they proposed. The final sections discuss the eventual approval of Deas Thomson’s DEB system, and not that recommended by the Commission of Official Accounts. This provides an understanding of the forces, struggles and motives which influenced the adoption of DEB by the British Government that moves the balance of explanation from ideological conflict based on class as preferred by Edwards et al (2002) to personal antagonisms, professional ambition and intolerance which reflected the intensity of commitment to the liberal ideal of economy. Ultimately it was the liberal imperative of economy in government which triumphed.

Liberalism and the Virtue of Economy
In the writings of John Locke can be discerned the main principles around which liberalism was later to coalesce. In his Two Treatises on Government he concluded that 
the natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. 
The liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, not under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislation shall enact according to the trust put in it (quoted in Lane 1996, p.52).

Personal liberty, to the extent that it does not impinge on the ability of others to enjoy similar opportunities for liberty, must be protected for the liberal if individuals are to be provided with the opportunity not only to use their abilities and initiative in their own best interests but also that of society; private vices were the source of public virtues (Mandeville 1970; Bellamy 1992, p.ii). For liberals, society only has meaning to the extent that the individual is given pre-eminence. The individual, as found in the works of the great classical liberal theorists Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Bentham, Mill and Pain, is prior to society (see Arblaster 1984, p.14; Kymlicka 1990, p.207; Brown 1993, p.109; Mistzal 1996, p.34). Josiah Tucker in 1756 was impressed with the way in which “the universal mover in human nature, self-love, may receive such a direction … as to promote the public interest by those efforts it shall make towards pursuing its own” (quoted in Hayek 1969, p.7). In his Thoughts and Details of Scarcity, Edmund Burke reinforced the way in which “(t)he benign and wise prosper of all things, who obliges men, whether they will or will not, in pursuing their own selfish interests to connect the general good with their own individual success” (quoted in Hayek 1969, p.7). From the 18th century classical liberal theorists had proclaimed a mutual dependence between liberty and private property. Indeed, the sanctity of private property was seen as the embodiment of liberty. Society, it was determined, is composed of free and equal individuals related to each other only through their possessions where “the relation of exchange … is seen as the fundamental relation of society” (Tully 1993, pp.75-76; see also Hayek 1969, p.4). 

At the heart of the classical liberal theory developed by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke was the dependent relationship between an individual’s liberty, the roles assumed by the State and the financial burdens that these would create and, hence, the impact on the sanctity of private property whereby each individual was to be allowed to employ their labour and capital as they believed best. Liberalism saw a need for the State but mainly to ensure the circumstances which would allow individuals the political and economic freedom to pursue their own best interests which was also the source of the well-being of the social collective. This would require that individuals were not burdened with overbearing, inhibiting financial requirements of the State exacted by taxation and other pecuniary imposts, that the State would make economy in service delivery its priority. Instead of the government imposing itself on its citizens with unremitting demands for money, “money should be left to fructify in the pockets of the taxpayer”, a phrase mostly associated with Gladstone and the unrelenting demand by liberals for lower taxes (Chubb 1952, p.33; MacDonagh 1977, p.203; Matthew 1978, p.xxxiii). The pre-eminence given to economy in public affairs in the 19th century was not a belief which was confined to the rising merchant middle class. This study confirms, as do Edwards et al (2002, p.241), that a greater concern for economy increasingly came to characterise the expectations and values of both sides of Parliament, the landed aristocracy and the rising merchant classes. 

By the early 19th century, for many of the middle and upper classes the greatest threat to the British constitution was extravagant spending by governments (see Houghton 1957, pp.55-56: Fortnightly Review, Vol. XXXII, New Series 1882, p. 723; The British Conversationalist, Vol. III, New Series 1857, pp. 65-67,123-129,169-171,217-221,267-271). From the late 18th century economy had increasingly become the measure of virtue and worth of government programs and the level of intrusion of the State (see "Observations of Lord Panmure" February 1855, Douglas, 1908, p. 46; Wright 1969, p.330; Edinburgh Review 1855, p.539). It was a time, note Edwards et al (2002, p. 642), when “(e)ffective control over government expenditure was therefore seen to be an essential precondition for the creation of an economic climate conducive to market-based developments …”. According to one contemporary of the liberal Edmund Burke “oeconomy was the word ... which like the Sun, diffused its glorious spirit ... over the whole kingdom” (quoted in Roseveare 1969, p.118). “Oeconomy, the most rigid and exact oeconomy, was become absolutely necessary …”(Burke, Parliamentary History XX, 7 December 1779, column 1257). Burke’s call in the late 1780s for the illumination and elimination of waste in public affairs​[5]​ (Mac Cunn 1913) was proclaimed a core liberal belief of the emerging middle classes and their liberal ethos which, suggests Briggs (1972, p.20), “set the standard for the nation” (see also Harrison 1971, p.101). Burke’s program for the liberal reform of public finances which was enacted in the movement of economical reform created a wave of righteous fervour, the effects of which were felt for most of the next century. 

The movement of economical reform, which embodied the liberal beliefs of its most influential advocates, Jeremy Bentham, Joseph Hume and Edmund Burke, sought the means to diminish the influence of the Crown and, thereby, remove the patronage and the alleged consequential corruption, the amateurism and inefficiency, the extravagance and waste, the secrecy and lack of accountability which afflicted British governments (Perkin, 1969, p.320; Edwards et al 2002, p.643; Edwards and Greener 2003, p.53; Keir 1934). Burke reminded his audience that the “distinguishing part” of the English constitution was the primacy of liberty (Edmund Burke, Speech at Bristol 1774 in Burke, 1942: 66, see also Burke 1790 in Roberts, 1977: 59; Macaulay, 1966: 31; John Telwall in Ward, 2004: 186). To achieve this, according to Burke, the “only security” was a strong, independent and vigilant parliament especially in matters of finance (Burke 1790, quoted in Roberts, 1977: 59; see also Lord Shelburne, Parliamentary History, XX, February 1780, columns 1319-1320; see also Sir J.P. Clerke in Parliamentary History XX, 12 February 1779, column 124). The people, reminded Edmund Burke, “took infinite pains to inculcate, as a fundamental principle, that in all monarchies the people must in effect themselves … possess the power of granting their own money, or no shadow of liberty could subsist” (Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies, 22 March 1795, in Burke, 1942: 92). Parliament’s exclusive authority to grant money was 
the great and most important Right of this House …. It is a Right  … that never ought to come into doubt; it is a Right which we cannot part with the sole Exercise of, without giving up our own power, without betraying the Liberties of our constituents (Speaker Onslow, House of Commons 11 February 1740, quoted in Thomas, 1971: 65).

In direct confrontation with the ‘old order’, Burke and like- minded liberals demanded “selection and promotion by merit, professional efficiency, retrenchment and economy, publicity and full financial accountability”, all key aspects of liberal ideology (Perkin, 1969, p.320) ​[6]​. Torrance (1978, p. 71) refers to the way in which the commercial middle classes sought to proclaim “its class interest as the universal interest”. Burke’s cry for economy, and that of Joseph Hume, was later taken up and sustained at regular intervals in Parliament in the early 19th century, contributing substantially to Whig popularity and their liberal policies throughout the middle decades of the 19th century (Hume, House of Commons (HC) debates, 20 and 27 February 1829; Sir John Yorke, HC debates, 13 December 1830; Sir James Graham, HC debates, 29 March 1830; Buxton 1888, p.ix). Those leading the movement around which demands for reform crystallised also understood that the effectiveness of any financial reforms ultimately depended upon forcing government officers to account for the performance of their duties (see Burke, Parliamentary History, Vol.XX, 14 December 1778, col. 83).

Accounting for Economy
An overly complicated, anachronistic system of public accounts used by departments of State was accused of contributing to the abuses identified by economical reformists by undermining the financial accountability of senior members of the civil service and the government and preventing the true extent of the government’s financial mismanagement from being known (HC Debates. 1 February 1821 vol. 4, cc 307). One Member of Parliament mockingly referred to “persons who were fully competent to understand any system of accounts” considered “the accounts of the Chancellor of the Exchequer (to be) beyond their comprehension” (HC Debates. 1 February 1821 vol. 4 cc 307-8). The paucity of the information furnished to Parliament was obvious in the official Return to an Order of the House of Commons in 1816 (Sessional Paper, No. 412) which complained that “owing to the confused state in which the Public Accounts were kept previous to 1800, no accurate view of the Income and Expenditure previous to that date could be made out” (British Parliamentary Papers (hereafter BPP) 1868-69(366) (366-I). So poor were all Executive accounts that, according to Burke, it had never been possible for the Treasury to “make even a tolerable guess” of the government’s expenditures in any one year (Burke in Cohen 1965, p.22, also see Reitan 1966, p.331). 

Forcing the Executive to account for its expenditures on a regular, yearly basis, urged Lord Shelburne, would encourage economy and help to prevent abuses which threatened the ‘Constitution’, that is the liberty of all (Lord Shelburne cited in Fitzmaurice 1912, p.226). Similar sentiments, which echoed the dependence of liberty on regular accounting, were coincidently expressed by the influential Charles Fox when he warned that if Parliament did not have 
a right to interfere, to reform, arrange, and if necessary, to resume the grants they had made to the Crown for public purposes … there was at once an end of the liberties of this country … Give princes and their ministers the exclusive right of disposing of any considerable part of the treasures of the nation without controul or without account; and our liberties from that instant would be gone for ever (quoted in Reitan, 1966: 333).

The success of the economical reforms advocated by Burke was believed at the time to depend entirely upon a comprehensive, thorough and punctual accounting of all civil list offices to expose the full extent of the corrupting influence of patronage and the cost that this represented to the nation. According to Lord Shelburne and the Commissioner’s for Examining the Public Accounts, which was appointed in the latter decades of the 18th century, publicising executive expenditure through the obligation to present yearly accounts was the surest way to ensure economy (Shelburne cited in Fitzmaurice, 1912: 226; “Sixth Report of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts”, Journals of the House of Commons, 11 February 1782: 713). Economy and a healthy constitution would never be possible in the absence of a system of accounts which allowed payments to be verified and which enabled performance to be compared across time and in different departments. Burke sought to introduce
a better order into management of expences of his Majesty’s civil establishments, by rendering the public accounts more easy, by a further security for the independence of parliament, and applying monies which are not now so profitably husbanded to the public service …. (Parliamentary History XXI, 23 February 1780, column 111).

Demands by Burke for improved Executive accounting were soon addressed by the reforms which followed the remarkable recommendations of Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts between 1780 and 1787 in response to the financial troubles created by the American War of Independence (see Funnell 2008). Their recommendations for the reform of the civil list accounts and the management of the civil list, later known as the civil service, drove public sector reform and overturned centuries of resilient, embedded practices which had nothing to commend them beyond their standing as custom and the powerful vested interests that they served. With the appointment of the Commissioners Lord North sought to ensure that the achievement of economy became a technical, and not a constitutional, matter of better accounting and improved administrative systems. This was clearly established in the Act under which the Commissioners were appointed (20 Geo.III, c.54)​[7]​. It sought to
introduce that System of strict Economy in the Administration of the Public Revenue, which the Legislature has … determined to be necessary. By strict Economy we apprehend, is not meant such as either derogates from the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, or abridges the Servant of the Public of the due Reward of his Industry and Abilities; we mean an Economy that steers between extreme Parsimony on the one Hand, and Profusion on the other; that is confident with Justice as well as Prudence; that gives to all their full Due, and to none more; that supports every useful and necessary Establishment, but cuts off and reduces every superfluous and redundant Expence (emphasis added).

Subsequently, the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts confirmed in their Fourteenth Report that their aims had been to expose and redress poor economy and to introduce greater regularity and system in government administration (see also Torrance, 1978: 57). It was “no mark of wisdom”, noted the Commissioners, “even in an opulent Nation, to lavish the Public Treasure in Expences unprofitable to the State” (“Fourteenth Report of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts”, Journals of the House of Commons, 26-27 January 1786: 23). Proclaiming both the condition of the nation’s finances and affirming the demands of the movement of economical reform, the Commissioners urged that “every Reason of Prudence demands the Reduction of … Emoluments, from an Excess to a reasonable limited standard” (Sixth Report, Journals of the House of Commons, 11 February 1782: 711,712). The Commissioners’ Seventh and Eighth Reports were especially important for their exposure for the first time of the reasons for the astonishing delays in the surrendering of public monies appropriated to both the civil list and to the military and in the auditing of the public accounts. In one particularly prominent case, as a result of their investigations of the Exchequer, the Commissioners discovered that the Pay Offices of the Navy and Army had been £75million in arrears for more than 24 years (“Eleventh Report of the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts”, Journals of the House of Commons, 4-5 December 1783: 45). 

The debilitating financial legacy of the Napoleonic wars saw financial matters again become the dominant concern of reformists in Parliament. Thus, on 1 July 1819 Parnell tabled in the House of Commons 46 resolutions concerning the retrenchment of public expenditure drawn from the recommendations and resolutions of various contemporary commissions and committees of the Commons. Most importantly, and remarkably for the time, three of Parnell’s resolutions referred to recommendations for the use by government of “mercantile accounts” (BPP 1819(542) p.2). He urged the House “to make such changes in the old systems, as the new state of the financial difficulties absolutely require, as well as the modern improvements in conducting matters connected with money transactions” (HC debates, First Series Vol. 40, July 1819, Col 1551-68). Parnell’s resolutions, which were tabled on 1 July 1819, were reinforced by the highly controversial, innovative proposal of the Select Committee on Finance in their Fifth Report of 2 July 1819 that the public accounts should be kept using the same mode of examining and passing accounts as used “by the mercantile and commercial men of this country” (BPP 1819(539) (121), p.122). The Select Committee based their proposal on their perception that the accounting procedures in government and commerce were fundamentally similar, and the conviction that the ‘men of commerce’ would not have selected a mode of accounting that was deficient in any way (BPP 1819(539) (121), p.122). On a later occasion Henry Parnell enquired “whether the national business was to be impeded because the Chancellor of the Exchequer had got a complicated system of accounts?” Accordingly, he saw no reason why the accounts of the nation should not be kept in the same manner as the accounts of a private merchant which, he argued, would promote completeness in the accounts, the first priority if they were to be used to provide better control over the level of spending (HC debates, Second Series Vol. 4, February 1821, Col. 307-8). The first to address this challenge was Deas Thomson, Accountant-General of the Navy. 

Deas Thomson and Initial Attempts to Introduce DEB in the Navy
Background
Through his mother, Katherine Deas, the only daughter of a merchant from Leith, Scotland, John Deas Thomson (1763-1838) could trace a connection with the illustrious family of Dundas. This was a time when the politics and patronage of Scotland were effectively dominated by Henry Dundas, the first Viscount Melville, and afterwards by his son, the second Viscount (Foster 1978, p.5). Deas Thomson was to benefit also from a relationship with Charles Middleton, a member of his father’s family, who was to hold the positions of Comptroller of the Navy Board​[8]​ and the First Lord of The Admiralty. Thus, at a time when advancement was very dependent upon patronage, Deas Thomson was able to boast about his connection with Melville. In one prominent example in a note to the Duke of Wellington he assured the Duke that “your memoralist (Deas Thomson) immediately set about introducing a system of account with which his early habits rendered him familiar, of the efficacy and value of which he can with confidence appeal to his respected friend Lord Melville …” (Grigg Family Papers). 

After the appointment of Deas Thomson’s father, John senior, to the position of Naval Officer/Storekeeper when a naval depot was established at Leith in Scotland in 1781 Deas Thomson acted as a clerk and assistant to his father (Grigg Family papers, October 1781). Subsequent to the peace which was signed between Britain and the United States of America at the Peace of Paris in 1783 and the closure of the naval office, Deas Thomson moved to South Carolina in the United States in order to recover some legacies that had been bequeathed to him by relatives of his family (Foster, 1978, p.2). Another reference describes Deas Thomson’s purpose in travelling to Charleston, North Carolina, as “a vain effort to clear up financial confusion arising from the American Revolution and the demise of several relatives” (Moore, 1970, p.189). Soon after his arrival, Deas Thomson entered into business with the purchase of a share in a small river-schooner later becoming a rice planter. He evidently prospered for he invested heavily in cattle, land and slaves (Foster 1978 p.2; Moore, 1970, p.189). He became a US citizen (Moore, 1970, p.189), and married the daughter of an influential and respected local planter (Foster, 1978, p.2). 

Deas Thomson returned to Scotland after the Navy Office at Leith had been re-established in the mid-1780’s and his father had been re-appointed to the position of Naval Officer/Storekeeper. He also commenced a successful business as a merchant in Leith (Foster, 1978, p.2). In 1798 John senior was injured in the execution of his duties which resulted in him relinquishing his position and Deas Thomson being appointed Naval Officer in his place. On a change in government in 1804 Deas Thomson was to benefit from his family connections when he was called to London by Middleton and recommended to assist the first Viscount Melville in collating papers in Middleton’s possession. Subsequently, Deas Thomson was appointed Secretary to the Committee of Naval Revision in 1805 which was chaired by Middleton. In May 1805 Middleton was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty following the resignation of Viscount Melville and advanced to the peerage as Lord Barham. In July 1805, Deas Thomson was appointed a Principal Officer and Commissioner of the Navy and became chair of the Navy’s Committee of Accounts in 1825 (TNA: ADM 106/2714). 

Deas Thomson’s experience in South Carolina and as a merchant in Leith gave him a strong practical understanding of mercantile DEB. This is clearly confirmed in a number of cash books that he had maintained while living in South Carolina (Mitchell Library, Thomson Family Papers) and with the contents of a letter which he sent in 1832 to the Duke of Wellington. In the letter he referred to the “system of account” used in Navy at the time of his succession to the Chairmanship of the Committee of Accounts of the Navy Board as one which made 
it impracticable to render any distinct or intelligent statement of the real receipt and expenditure of the Navy in any shape to be comprehended by members of the government. That your memoralist immediately set about introducing a system of account, with which his early habits in life rendered him familiar (Grigg Family papers).  

Deas Thomson’s commercial experience and knowledge of DEB is also later referred to in the Minutes of Evidence in the Report from the Select Committee on Income and Property Tax (BPP 1862(467)). At paragraph 9, Richard Bromley, the then Accountant General of the Navy, referred to the 
system that had partly been introduced by Sir John Thomson, who had been the Accountant General of the Navy under the Navy Board, and who had previously been connected with commerce, and who, therefore was conversant with the commercial system of double entry. He, under the Navy Board, to a great extent commenced, with Mr Anderson as an assistant, to prepare books upon the principle of double entry (BPP 1862(467), p.2, emphasis added). 

Career with the Navy Board and Development of DEB Systems
As chair of the Committee of Accounts, in 1825 Deas Thomson conducted a detailed examination of the Navy’s accounting systems. In his twenty-one page report, the “Memorandum on that Branch of the Civil Service of the Navy, which relates to the Receipt, Expenditure and Mode of Accounting for the money annually voted by Parliament for Naval Services” (TNA:ADM 106/2714), he noted that he had regarded it as “his duty to enter, somewhat minutely, into a general examination of the system by which the business in the Department of Accounts has been conducted, and to suggest such improvements as appear to him necessary towards rendering it more complete and better adapted to the ends in view” (TNA: ADM 106/2714, emphasis added). Deas Thomson referred to the system of accounting used in the Navy at the time of his succession to the chairmanship of the Committee of Accounts of the Navy Board as one which made “it impracticable to render any distinct or intelligent statement of the real receipt and expenditure of the Navy in any shape to be comprehended by members of the government” (Grigg Family Papers). B&B, as paraphrased by Parnell, later described the Navy’s existing, officially approved cash accounting system based upon the principles of ‘charge and discharge’, the primary objective being personal accountability, as 
various, complicated, and expensive; without fixed rules clearly defined, and not generally applicable; a system framed in accommodation to the transactions of time remote from the present, and under circumstances which have since undergone considerable alteration (Parnell 1831 p.159). 

William Anderson, who was to work with Deas Thomson in the development of a DEB system, believed that the Navy accounts were the most complex government accounts that he had ever seen and incapable of providing any details which would assist in the promoting economy in operations (BPP 1845(520), Question 1314 to William Anderson p.101; BPP 1849(499) (499-II), Question 8588, p.578). Unsurprisingly, the long established accounting system had resulted in the Navy experiencing many accounting difficulties including, assured Anderson, the impossibility of rendering an accurate account of the Navy receipts and expenditure for “there were no books in existence from which the information could be collected” (BPP 1845(520), Question 1313 to Anderson p.101). Deas Thomson was determined that these failings would no longer be tolerated. Hence, drawing upon his business experience he informed the Board that he had taken the initiative to augment the existing approved accounts with a new system of accounts based upon 
that in universal use in the Mercantile world … (which) will afford at all times a distinct and I trust accurate view of the receipt, expenditure and mode of accounting for all the money voted by Parliament for naval purposes or derived from other sources (NMM​[9]​: ADM. BP/47B, emphasis in original).

Deas Thomson believed that a double-entry accounting system would allow the Navy’s accounts to strengthen their traditional accountability role by allowing the accounts to “shew the amount paid under every Head of Expenditure whatever, in the most satisfactory manner, and account for all the sums voted by Parliament for every Branch of that portion of the Naval Service under the direction of the Naval Board” (TNA: ADM 106/2714). Crucially, this would provide also the opportunity for the accounts to be a constant, reliable check on the economy of the Navy’s operations. 

Deas Thomson’s DEB system was not designed around a strict version of cash accounting such as that then used throughout government, whereby a record was made only of money received and money paid within a given period. Instead, it was what would be regarded today as a modified cash accounting system whereby receipts and disbursements committed but not paid in the budget year were recognised in the accounts, thereby incorporating elements of an accrual-based accounting system. In his report to Lord Melville, Deas Thomson stressed that “a Bill given to a Claimant in payment of an article delivered or for a service performed is in every respect an actual payment, the Claimant being satisfied and the service being at an end; and it is most properly recorded under the date when the settlement of the claim took place” (TNA: T92/153B). Deas Thomson’s modified cash-based DEB system, recognising the context in which it was to operate, retained an emphasis on personal accountability but, most importantly, sought to ensure for the first time an effective control over the level of spending. He noted that it was “adopted in its mercantile form without prejudging the deviations which it might be necessary to make from it, to adapt it entirely to the wants of the office” (TNA: T 92/153B). Deas Thomson’s system was mercantile in the sense of following the double entry form used by merchants and the need to record non-cash transactions. 

The use of abstract books by Deas Thomson was described soon after by Cory as being “one of the best modifications that has ever been made in the Italian method of accounts” (Cory 1840, p. 112). The abstract books acted as subsidiary ledgers which were necessary to relieve the journal and the ledger of the details of large volumes of transactions being handled by the clerks in the Navy Office under the approved system of accounting which required detailed entries about transactions in the ledger. The abstract contained details of the civil servants who were entrusted with funds for payments or who received funds on behalf of the government, thereby ensuring that a strong emphasis on personal accountability was preserved. Deas Thomson’s primary concern was completeness of the accounts, to ensure that all transactions relevant to a particular year were present in the accounts, rather than recording according to categories of appropriation although this still remained a priority. This would allow departments and Parliament to both confirm that spending had been carried out as approved by Parliament but also to highlight the level of spending, both actual and committed, to engender a conscious need to operate with economy. An especially important innovation in Deas Thomson’s system was the closing of the books of account “as soon as possible after the termination of the year, and the Balances struck, and transferred to the books for the succeeding year” (Deas Thomson, TNA: T92/153B). Accordingly, rather than the accounting changes directly reflecting ideological conflict they could be seen as an accommodation of the beliefs and values of both the merchant and landed classes.

Henry Parnell later accepted the importance of Deas Thomson’s work when he told Parliament that he believed that “(t)he country was much obliged to the person who had reduced the Navy Accounts to a system of Double Entry; and it would be most useful if it was adopted generally throughout the accounts of the country. Hitherto they have been going upon a system of entire deception” (HC Debates 25 February 1831 vol. 2 cc 947-63). Many years later the magnitude and importance of Deas Thomson’s accounting innovations were also corroborated by Sir William Anderson, then Assistant Comptroller and Auditor General and previously Deas Thomson’s assistant, who confirmed that this “was the first instance in which the commercial system of double entry was applied to the accounts of a great public department in this country” (BPP 1873(70), p.87). 

While Deas Thomson’s lineage may have sensitised him to the expectations of the governing class, the landed aristocracy, the form of the accounting system which he introduced indicates that these were not the determining influences. Instead, his experience in business and the need to manage an increasingly complex and costly department made him aware of the need for a more sophisticated, yet simple system of accounting which could both enhance accountability and promote economy, two fundamental precepts of liberalism. Between 65 and 70% of total government funds was allocated to the services during wartime between 1689 and 1815. Rodger (2011, p.122) points out that during the 18th century 
Britain was consistently spending double the amount of France, as a proportion of national income, and three times as much per capita …. Navies have always been far more complex and capital-intensive than armies, (t)he industrial, technical and managerial resources required to build and operate warships vastly exceeded in kind and quality anything needed by an early modern army (Rodger, 2011, p.123; see also O’Brien 1988, p.2). 

Deas Thomson’s Committee of Accounts were so confident about their new trial system after two years of successful operation that, in March 1828, they sought from the Navy Board their agreement to make it the approved system (TNA: T92/155 and ADM 106/3512). They were, however, to be greatly disappointed for, despite the acknowledged benefits of Deas Thomson’s system which had influenced the Navy Board’s decision to allow Deas Thomson to continue to use his new accounts, on 7 March 1828 the Navy Board resolved that it “does not think expedient to take this subject into consideration at this time as it is understood the Committee of Finance has got it before them” (TNA: ADM 106/2714). After previous unsuccessful attempts around 1820 to compel Parliament to reform the public accounts according “to the mercantile and commercial men of this country”, in 1828 Parliament’s Committee of Finance​[10]​ recommended to Treasury that the public accounts ought to be maintained on the basis of double-entry bookkeeping (Fifth Report of the Committee of Finance, BPP 1819(539) (121), p.2; also see Joseph Hume, HC Debates 5 February 1822 vol. 6 cc 53;, TNA: T64/395). This prompted the Treasury to appoint the Commission of Official Accounts to
inquire into and to state the manner in which the Public Accounts are kept in the several Principal Departments connected with the receipt and expenditure of the money granted by Parliament for the Public Service, and to state the purpose for which each Book is kept, and the nature of the information it is calculated to afford; and if such Persons were also  required to offer such suggestions as may, after such Inquiry, appear to them as tending to a more uniform system of keeping those Accounts, as well as calculated to afford more satisfactory and ready information in regard to the nature and the amount of the expenditure under each particular Head of Service. And further, to consider how far it may appear to be practicable and advantageous to employ the mercantile system of Double Entry in the keeping of the Public Accounts, in preference to the official system now in use (BPP 1829(290) App.1).

To achieve these aims the Treasury appointed “two Persons of experience in the mode of keeping the public accounts (Thomas Constantine Brooksbank, Samuel Beltz), together with an Individual well acquainted with the system of keeping and stating Mercantile Accounts (Peter Harriss Abbott)” (BPP 1829(290) App.1).

The Commission of Official Accounts
Abbott was a well-known private sector accountant with a career embedded in trade which meant that he brought with him to the Commission experience in the design and implementation of accounting systems based upon DEB. Exceptionally, Abbott had previously designed DEB systems for the internal use of government bodies, the most important of these at the time of the Commission of Official Accounts was the Greenwich hospital which was to be the source of great antagonism between B&B and Abbott (for further details see Edwards 2001, p.680). Abbott had been requested in late 1828 by the Commissioners of the Greenwich Hospital to undertake an examination of the accounts of the hospital after a suspected fraud by one of their staff was discovered. Upon Abbott’s recommendation the hospital introduced a new accruals-based double-entry accounting system which B&B concluded was “framed upon the exact counting-house model, and, of course, kept upon the principle of double entry” (BPP 1829(290), p.101, emphasis added). Abbott was later described by The Accountant (17 November 1888:754) as “the practical founder of the profession of public accountants in this country” (Edwards 2001, p.679; see Edwards et al 2002, pp.643-644 for further details of Abbott’s career). Henry Parnell (1831, p.166) informed his readers that Abbott as “a professional mercantile accountant, … holds the highest rank; and he has acquired a full knowledge of official accounts by diligently making use of powers vested in him for ascertaining the nature, description, and purpose of the several books used in each office”. 

Edwards et al (2000, p. 646) conclude that the career and backgrounds of B&B and Abbott meant that they “would have viewed the nature and purpose of government accounting from contrasting ideological viewpoints”. B&B “perceived themselves as responsible for defending the traditional role of government accounting …”, that is for stewardship purposes to ensure personal accountability (Edwards et al 2002, p. 646). The result was that, while all the Commissioners knew that they were expected by Treasury to provide a joint, agreed report, it soon became apparent that this was unlikely to happen with B&B and Abbott having very different, unyielding views about the type of DEB system which should be implemented by the British Government and, therefore, the purposes which it was to achieve. Overwhelmingly, their disagreements were preoccupied with the emphasis given to cash transactions of the proposed DEB systems. B&B advocated a fully cash-based form of DEB which was to be analogous to the existing systems that were based upon charge and discharge accounting (B&B in BPP 1829(290), p.5; Edwards et al 2002, p.652). The pursuit of economy was not recognised as an aim of B&B’s system, which was also meant to be a generic system 
that would combine the several advantages of universality, simplicity and regularity, accessible to the understandings of Accountants of ordinary talents, and providing every desirable check for ensuring accuracy and expedition in the details of management, and for the due dispensation of the Public Money (BPP 1829(290), pp.87-8).

B&B believed that the system of double-entry bookkeeping “affords, unquestionably, valuable facilities for unravelling and elucidating complex or intricate Accounts”, most especially the robust checks on the actions of individuals provided by the interlocking form of DEB records and the overall check provided by a balance sheet (BPP 1829(290), p.5). To achieve these benefits, however, they, as did Deas Thomson, also cautioned that the peculiarities of government would mean that “it may not be advisable to employ it in its exact mercantile form, but in a manner … more immediately suited to the business and duties of the Offices of Government” (BPP 1829(290), p.5). Therefore, in contrast to Abbott and Deas Thomson, these accounts would not have any aspects of accrual accounting but retain the traditional emphasis on cash and protect the detail of transactions in the main books of account, the journal and the ledger, which was seen by B&B as essential to preserving an emphasis on personal accountability (BPP 1829, vi, p.89; Edwards et al, 2002, p.651). 

B&B were of the opinion that “in each department, two principal Books were indispensable for the purpose of registering and recording its pecuniary concerns; viz. A Cash Book and a Ledger: the first for entering the Receipts and Disbursements as they occur; and the latter for distributing and classing those Receipts and Disbursements under distinct and proper heads” (the same as those specified in the annual estimates) (BPP 1829(290), p.5). A major point of difference between B&B and Abbott was B&B’s recommendation that a journal be used only for transactions not entered in the Cash Book. This would have resulted in the majority of transactions not being posted via the journal. With reference to Abbott’s accounting system which was consistent with full accrual based commercial accounts, B&B were critical of “the Italian or Mercantile plan (where) … the entries in the Cash and Waste Books are transcribed and technically arranged in the Journal, and thence posted into the Ledger, where nothing more is shown …” (BPP 1829(290), p. 89).

Abbott, the practising public accountant and businessman, wanted no modifications to DEB as used by merchants, believing that the full accrual accounting of “a merchant should, without variation, be adopted in the offices of Government” (BPP 1831(50), App.1, p. 17, emphasis added). For Abbott what was crucial was both the form of DEB and the ‘mentality of the merchant’ that mercantile DEB allowed. Abbott’s accounting system was meant to support a culture in government which promoted the efficient and effective management of the finances of the British Government in the pursuit of economy. This pursuit of the liberal ideal for government, more than the form of DEB each preferred, differentiated the systems of B&B and Abbott. Whereas B&B’s proposed system perpetuated a major weakness of government accounts, the inability to close accounts on a regular basis, one of the key advantages of Abbott’s DEB system was the ability to close the accounts very soon after the end of an accounting period by recognising any outstanding liabilities using the journal. B&B stated that their motive was to arrive at the truest statement of the transactions of the department, even if this meant including transactions from different financial periods and excluding transactions of a period which, crucially, had not been completed with a cash payment (TNA: T92/153B, Part B, p. 28). They complained that it was essential, as their system did, to leave the accounts open at the end of the financial year until actual payments were made. 

For Abbott, B&B were unyielding products of their public careers; intolerant of change, ignorant of the financial benefits of mercantile DEB and guardians of existing arrangements and class interests. They did allow for moderate enhancements to existing practices but only those which were consistent with the fundamental values of personal accountability and stewardship of public funds. B&B’s insistence that the merchant’s form of DEB would need to be adjusted to the operational and constitutional practicalities of government was for Abbott confirmation that those who held power continued to resist any changes which may threaten the enduring the values and practices which perpetuated the social, political and economic advantages that they had long enjoyed. Thus, with such divergent views, not surprisingly B&B came to believe that, rather than working constructively with them, Abbott preferred to adopt a stance of arrogant insolence (BPP 1830(159), App.(B), p.16; BPP 1830(159), p.17). Abbott believed that the advantages of the commercial system of accounting which he proposed were so obvious and uncontested in the world of business that they did not need him to justify its selection. 
	
The tone of a minute to the Treasury by B&B on 22 May 1829 indicates the level of antipathy which had developed between B&B and Abbott (BPP 1830(159), App. (A)). The minute expresses B&B’s concern that the Commission would not be successful unless certain administrative procedures were followed by all of its members. In particular, that investigations should be carried out on a joint basis, that members should meet regularly and that the proceedings of all meetings should be minuted (BPP 1830(159), App. (A)). As an attachment to this minute, Brooksbank prepared a memorandum in which he noted that Abbott had objected to the minute. The breakdown in the relationship was also illustrated by the contents of a memorandum prepared following a meeting of the commissioners on 7 January 1829 when Abbott was accused by B&B of, amongst other things, carrying “on his proceedings alone” (BPP 1830(159), App.(B), p.16). The already delicate relationship was to sour badly when B&B became aware that Abbott had not told them about the accruals-based DEB accounting system at Greenwich Hospital which he had introduced. By chance, they had only become aware of the new system on a visit to the hospital (BPP 1829(290), p.101). 

This increasing hostility and distance between the Commissioners finally resulted in B&B printing their Report without any input from Abbott, after which it was sent to the Treasury on 9 February 1829. This incensed Abbott, who now realised that however persuasive might be his suggestions for the reform of public accounts they would face formidable resistance and gain little support from either key individuals or critical public sector bodies, most especially the Treasury​[11]​. This did not prevent him from quickly completing five separate reports dated 28 February 1829, one for each of the Navy and Navy Pay Offices, the Transport Office, the Paymaster of Marines, the Victualling Office and the Ordnance Department. As expected, these reports were not considered by the Treasury and on 14 July 1829 a Treasury Minute was issued which demanded the implementation of B&B’s accounting system no later than January 1830 by the Commissioners of the Navy, the Treasurer of the Navy, and the Commissioners of Victualling (BPP 1831(50), App. 1, p.17). 

The Navy Board and the Paymaster of Marines, however, continued to oppose strenuously the introduction of B&B’s approved accounting system. Irrespective of the new system of accounting which might be suggested, the Navy Board made it very clear that they “(d)eprecate all interference; would revert to their old system in practice five years ago, with some contemplated modifications, in preference to the mercantile system lately under trial in the Navy Office (that is Deas Thomson’s system), or to that approved by the Treasury” (BPP 1831(50), p.16). Following receipt of B&B’s Second Report on progress in implementing their system, on 9 February 1830 the Lords Commissioners of Treasury issued a minute which reiterated their decision of 14 July 1829 and their impatience with a resistant Navy Board. They dismissed what they referred to as “the erroneous views and impressions entertained by the Navy Board” and directed “that the books and plan of account (of B&B’s system) be introduced and acted upon in the Navy and Victualling departments, as soon as practicable …” (BPP 1831(50), p.47). 

Unbeknown to B&B, soon after the Navy Board had been ordered to implement B&B’s system of accounts, Deas Thomson, now the Accountant-General of the Navy, had been called upon by the Board to report on the recommendations of the Commissioners of Official Accounts and the implications for the Navy (TNA: ADM 106/2739). Deas Thomson saw this as the opportunity to have his accounting system reconsidered given the hostility of the Navy Board towards the system advocated by B&B. It was becoming obvious to all that Treasury and the Admiralty were intent on replacing the existing charge and discharge accounting system and that the Navy Board’s wishes may count for little. Accordingly, with Deas Thomson as a member of the Navy Board and the author of the accounting system which had been under prolonged trial in the Navy Office, it would appear that he believed that his known, well-practised system which had arisen from the needs of the Navy may now be a more acceptable alternative to the Navy Board if a new system could not be avoided. Thus, Deas Thomson prepared a fourteen page report for the Navy Board, dated 21 October 1829, which included outlines of his trial system then in use and B&B’s system which was meant to replace it (TNA: ADM106/2739). In his memorandum to the Navy Board, Deas Thomson took the opportunity to assure the Board, although to no avail, that his system “in every respect was calculated to meet the needs of the service, with every regard to economy and despatch, whilst the results produced by it have met with the entire approbation of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty …” (TNA: ADM 106/2739). He reminded the Board that the major difference between his system then in operation and that recommended by B&B arose from 
a different view taken of the nature of the payments; under the present system all services paid by bills are debited in the Ledger with the amount of such bills, and all services paid in cash are also debited in the Ledger with the amount of such cash payments. The Commissioners on the other hand, considering all bills issued as prospective payments, propose that no entry of them should be made in the Ledger until they are returned paid by the Treasurer. But it is conceived that a Bill given to a claimant in payment of an article delivered or for a service performed is in every respect an actual payment, the claimant being satisfied and the service being at an end; and it is most properly recorded under the date when the settlement of the claim took place (TNA: T92/153B, Part B, p.24, emphasis in original).

However persuasive Deas Thomson’s case appeared, ultimately it took a major dramatic change in government before his system of accounting would be finally accepted. Despite Treasury’s unqualified support for B&B’s system and their determination that this would be the system of all government departments, on 17 December 1830, after the election of Earl Grey’s Whig government in November, the Lords of the Treasury directed that the application of the B&B system to “any public department in which it is not already introduced in practice, be suspended till further orders” (BPP 1831(50), p.48; TNA: T64/395). 

Sir James Graham and the Liberal Economic Imperative in the Implementation of DEB 
The Champion of Economy
After being out of office for nearly 50 years, from 1783 to 1830, the newly elected Whigs were driven by a build-up of reformist zeal which meant a determination to institute their transformative political and social programmes. Amongst the earliest initiatives was the appointment of a Commission of Public Accounts. The Commission included members of both the landed aristocracy, most importantly for this study Sir James Graham, and members with strong business backgrounds, including Edward Ellice, Charles Poulett Thomson and Francis Baring (for details see Edwards and Greener 2003, pp.56-58). Although Edwards et al (2002, p. 640) did refer to the importance of the support of high profile politicians for the reform of public accounts, notably John Herries and Sir Henry Parnell, their references to these identities excluded Sir James Graham. Soon after the creation of the Commission of Public Accounts, a sub-committee chaired by Sir James Graham was “appointed to inquire into the system of Account and Audit in operation in the Accountant-General’s Branch of the Admiralty” (BPP 1873(70), p.86). William Anderson later observed that “Sir James Graham was strongly of the opinion that an efficient system of accounts was the keystone of his financial reforms in the Naval Department …” (BPP 1873(70), p. 86-7). In an acclaimed speech in Parliament on 14 March 1830, before demanding a “measure of substantive retrenchment, economy and reform” Graham insisted that “the representatives of the people, the guardians of the public purse, were entitled as of right to call for statements of what sums of public money had been received by any particular individual or number of individuals or class of individuals ….”. 

Early in his time in office, Graham confirmed that his priorities were economy, efficiency, accountability for the use of public money and an end to political appointments (HC debates, 14 February 1832, p.129). By the time Graham left the Admiralty in 1835 he had managed to reduce naval spending from £5,045,827 in 1832 to £4,658,000 in 1835 (Ward 1967, p.128). This, praised The Black Book of the Aristocracy, set a “splendid example to the heads of Departments” (in Parker 1907, Vol.I, p.147). Economy in government was a life-long passion and work of Sir James Graham who, despite his privileged landed class origins, in the middle decades of the 19th century epitomised the ideals of modern liberalism and its crusade for economy. Graham was born into the landed aristocracy on both sides of his family. His mother’s father was the 7th Earl of Galloway. As First Lord of the Admiralty between 1831-4 and 1852-5 he was well known for his financial obsessions which had a disproportionate influence in determining the form and intent of modern central government accounting of which the introduction of DEB in the Navy and the passage of the 1832 Audit Act, the first modern public sector audit act, were pre-eminent. 

Until Graham forsook the Whigs and joined the Tory Party in 1835 he had developed a reputation as a committed political liberal reformer (Ward 1967, p.xiii), respected as a master of financial detail and a valued member of many House of Commons committees. Parker (1907, Vol.II, p.215) describes his administrative experience and knowledge as “unrivalled” (see also Greville to Queen Victoria, January 1849, in Ward 1967, p.238; Melville to Fox Maule, 30 January 1840 in Donajgrodzki 1977, p.103-4). Apart from Gladstone, no-one in the mid-19th century was more closely associated with the reforms to public sector accounts and audit. Graham was particularly well known from the late 1820s for his denunciations of poor government accounting, public extravagance and the pursuit of fraudulent behaviour (Erickson 1952, pp.65-66). According to Parker (1907, Vol.I, p.146), no minister in Lord Grey’s cabinet in 1830 was “more deeply pledged” to retrenchment. Indeed, Graham’s correspondence bears “abundant testimony to … (his) leanings to retrenchment” (Parker 1907, Vol.I, p.156). 

As early as 1825 James Butler had remarked upon Graham's passion for economy (see Erickson 1952, pp.65,66; Ward 1967, pp.39,83; for examples of calls for economy by Graham see House of Commons (HC) debates 12 February 1830, 5 April 1830, col.1271, 14 May 1830, cols.519, 731, 7 June 1830, cols.279-280, 25 February 1831, cols.953-54). Economy for Graham, like William Gladstone​[12]​, informed both his private and public life. His liberal belief that government intervention should be kept to a minimum was heavily influenced by his reading of Smith, Bentham and Hume (see Erickson 1952, pp.36-56). Thus, Graham’s extraordinary role in the reform of central government accounting cannot be understood in isolation from his impassioned personal philosophy of stringent economy. In his public career he was unable to leave behind deeply ingrained habits and attitudes, direct his energies elsewhere and overlook any instances of blatant and inexcusable financial profligacy. When making his will in 1823 Graham indicated the enduring concern for wise financial stewardship that would frame his life by directing that the trustees of the estate should deal with his estate with “strict economy”, although he did not “wish to enforce a niggardly system ... I wish only to urge abstinence from all fruitless and unnecessary expense” (Graham quoted in Parker 1907, Vol.I, p.67). 

A two hour speech to Parliament on the 12 February 1830 was particularly important in establishing Graham’s Benthamite credentials and marked in earnest his campaign for retrenchment in government spending. Bentham was so impressed with the speech that he sent Graham a copy of his latest book, Official Attitude Maximised and Expense Minimised (Ward 1967, p.85). In the same month Graham had drawn considerable attention to himself when he sought the abolition of the Treasurer of the Navy as a sinecure, thereby providing the opportunity for achieving a considerable financial saving (HC debates, 14 March 1830). Towards the end of his parliamentary career Graham reminded his friend John Roebuck that “for two or three years before the formation of Lord Grey's Government ... (particularly in 1830) I had taken a line which was considered radical on questions relating to public expenditure ... Reform and Retrenchment were the watchwords which led me to power” (Letter 4 January 1851, in Parker 1907, Vol.II, pp.117-8; see also HC debates, 14 May 1830; Ward 1967, p.84). In subsequent government appointments Graham maintained undiminished the same commitment to retrenchment which drove him to reform the accounts of the Navy and the organisation of the Navy’s departments. He still had “an anxious desire to enforce economy” (Anonymous 1853, p.175, also p.180), and thereby to remain true to those who had provided the impetus and conviction for economy in government with the movement for economical reform. 

Acceptance of Deas Thomson’s DEB System
With businessmen dominating membership of the Commission of Public Accounts and Graham’s determination to enforce economy and better management in government, not surprisingly the Commission advocated the adoption of “the Commercial system of Book-keeping, in its purest and most simple form” (BPP 1831, X: 17) which recognised the nature and demands of government: in effect, the form of DEB which had been implemented by Deas Thomson. Rather than adopt Abbott’s strident commercial form of DEB which made few if any concessions to the very different needs of government departments, Graham chose for the Navy the system of DEB developed by Deas Thomson which over several years had proved to meet the administrative and financial accountability needs of the Navy and had the ability to promote economy as a priority. Even though B&B’s mercantile DEB system had been approved by Treasury and its implementation had commenced in some departments, this was of little importance for Graham’s sub-committee which wanted to implement the
improved system of accounts, according to strict mercantile practice, which had been a few years under trial in the Navy Office, under the direction of the Chairman of the Committee of Accounts (Sir John Deas Thomson), but the Navy Board, of which he was a member, being opposed to the introduction of the mercantile system … the new books of account had never been officially recognised by them (Sub-committee report quoted in BPP 1873(70), pp. 86-87).

Soon after Deas Thomson’s system was accepted by the Admiralty and Treasury on the insistence of Graham as First Lord of the Admiralty. In a letter to his father in July 1831, Edward Deas Thomson congratulated his father who would 
have the proud satisfaction of having introduced a system, which showing at a glance, the expenditure for any service, will enable the public to judge whether the benefit is worth the expence (sic) – and thus the most important saving to the Country will be effected (Thomson Family Papers). 

Confirmation of the formal acceptance of Deas Thomson’s system in 1832, although without mentioning him by name, is contained in a statement in March 1844 by John Thomas Briggs, the then Accountant-General of the Navy. In response to a Return to an Order of the Honourable House of Commons, which required each of the public departments to prepare a “Statement of Changes which have been introduced into the Public Departments in the System of Book-keeping since the Report on the Exchequer, made by the Commissioners of Public Accounts in 1832”, Briggs advised that
The system of book-keeping in practice at the Admiralty is the Italian method, or double entry in its most improved form.
This system, though partially in force at the late Navy Office ... in October 1831, was extended so as to embrace the whole of the naval departments  (BPP 1844(364), p.2).

By the time that his system had gained official approval, Deas Thomson had been replaced as Accountant-General by Sir James Graham’s private secretary, John Thomas Briggs (HC Debates 25 February 1831 vol. 20 cc 947-93). Graham, without any recorded attempt to show Deas Thomson the respect that the choice of his system of accounting could be expected to have warranted, confirmed in Parliament that the retirement was forced upon Deas Thomson because he “was old, was entitled to superannuation and to his pay, and it was thought that it would be desirable that he should retire” (HC debates, Third Series Vol. 20, February 1831, Col. 947-93). 

Following his forced retirement in 1831, Deas Thomson was awarded a knighthood and he and his contributions which were the basis of the DEB system established throughout the British Government all but forgotten. Despite Deas Thomson’s achievements, neither present day accounting historians nor books such as A Practical Treatise on Accounts, Mercantile, Private, and Official (1840) by Isaac Cory have made any reference to him. Cory refers to the Admiralty system of accounts as “remodelled by Sir James Graham …” (Cory, 1840, p. 98) and which were “the result of the greatest perseverance and the most ingenious contrivances” as attaining “their present approximation to perfection ….  under the superintendence of its Accountant-General, Mr Briggs” (Cory 1840, pp.101, 123).

Conclusion
This study has provided the opportunity to identify the determining influence of the imperative of economy in liberal political theory in the introduction of DEB in British Government, especially the impetus given to these by Sir James Graham’s obsession with economy. To achieve this it has sought to expose the “underlying terrain of programmatic ambitions”, the achievement of which was dependent upon a unique set of interlocking social and institutional structures and personal relationships. The study has confirmed Jones’ (2010, p.82) description of the relationship between government and accounting as being “embedded within a broader nexus of interlocking structures and technologies. These involve personal relationships, institutional and organisational structures, economic, administrative, political structures and accounting technologies” (see also Funnell et al 2009; Rose 1991). In this study each of these elements is shown to have been implicated in the successful introduction of DEB in British Government. Although B&B and Abbott supported the introduction of the “mercantile​[13]​ system of double entry in keeping the public accounts” (BPP 1829, 290, Appendix 1), they differed significantly in their understanding of the importance of full accrual accounting for a mercantile form of DEB. The result was a contest between the Commissioners for the introduction of their preferred type of DEB that quickly degenerated into often personal and professional vilification which betrayed the class based priorities which they sought to provide (Edwards et al 2002, Abstract, pp.637,638; Perkin 1969, p.44; Edwards et al 2002, p.642).

Most especially, in contrast to Edwards et al (2002), this study has established that the ‘irreconcilable’ ideologies at the heart of contests over DEB in the public accounts in the early 19th century were not necessarily associated with individuals of a particular social class, although class did certainly influence ideological predispositions. Instead, by “probing into the underlying processes and forces at work” (Hopwood 1987, p.207) it has been established that the liberal ideal of stringent economy in government, which the introduction of DEB would be expected to promote, was championed by members of both the landed ruling class and the rising merchant classes. Mann (1986, p.1) has emphasised how society is “constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power”. Thus, rather than competing views of DEB which necessarily betrayed rigid class ideologies there was a contest of the priorities for government for, as Edwards et al (2002, pp. 639,640) at one point concede, often the most committed and effective promoters of reform who shared the liberal passion for economy in government came from the landed classes. This has required reassessing the importance which Edwards et al (2002) give to the destructive relationship between Brooksbank and Beltz and Abbott as embodying ideological conflict between social classes and the impact that this had on the DEB system finally selected.

Identification also of Deas Thomson as the instigator of a particular form of DEB in British Government, whose life, beliefs and appreciation of the benefits of DEB had been moulded by the ideologies of both the landed aristocracy and the merchant class, challenges the significance given by Edwards et al (2002) to class based ideological conflict in their assessment of the introduction of DEB. Deas Thomson, who spent most of his civil service career in the Navy Office and rose to the position of Accountant-General of the Navy, came from a privileged background which gave him considerable and influential access to highly placed members of the ‘old’ political elite but also he had operated successful businesses which exposed him to the accounting practices of merchants and an understanding of business values. Therefore, Deas Thomson, businessman and civil servant, at this time of ‘transition’ in the 19th century (Edwards et al 2002, p. 656) spanned the two social groupings identified by Edwards et al in their explanation of ideological conflict; the landed aristocracy and the rising wealthy business class. Deas Thomson’s DEB system very much reflected the main precepts of liberal political theory, in particular the critical importance of governments carrying out their functions with economy. The DEB system which Deas Thomson developed for the Navy and the values and priorities of the merchant class which it most immediately embodied therefore could be seen to contradict the expectation of Edwards et al (2002) that someone with Deas Thomson’s family history and social connections may have been an opponent of change and not the initiator of reform. 

Graham’s intervention as soon as possible once appointed First Lord of the Admiralty was further incontrovertible evidence of the non-classed based origins of the ideological impetus for the introduction of DEB. There was indeed an element of ideological conflict which was present in both the personal and professional conflict between B&B and Abbott and the rejection by the Navy Board of any move to DEB, irrespective of its form and despite the success of Deas Thomson’s innovative accounting system. However, evidence provided in this study indicates that the contest between the Commissioners of the Official Accounts over the introduction of DEB, rather than being exclusively, or even primarily, a matter of class based ideological differences was a complex amalgam of class interests and personal antipathy arising from professional intolerance, arrogance, ambition and opportunism but most especially the liberal ideology of the need to prioritise economy in public services. 

The study has also addressed a misconception contained in Edwards et al’s (2002) account of the final stages in the introduction of DEB and the system which was eventually accepted. They state that the approval by Treasury of B&B’s system of accounting resulted in “the introduction of a new form of accounting …” (Edwards et al 2002, p.656), that is B&B’s system. However, Edwards et al’s history of events fails to record that the planned implementation of B&B’s system was suspended by Treasury in late 1830 and it was never subsequently implemented. By ending their study in 1829 before the election of the Whigs in 1830 this resulted in Edwards et al giving unwarranted emphasis to the impact of the differences between the Commissioners on the form of DEB accepted by Treasury. It also resulted in attributing credit to B&B and their system of DEB as the one finally implemented when it was Graham and Deas Thomson, irrespective of any disagreements between the B&B and Abbott, who were responsible for the system of DEB approved for and adopted by the Navy . 

It is doubtful whether, even if B&B’s system had been implemented in the Navy before the election of Lord Grey’s Government, it would have been retained by Graham for whom it was essential that in addition to meeting basic accountability requirements the new accounting system was to be the means to promote economy in government. The DEB innovations introduced in the Navy Office by Deas Thomson and finally accepted by Graham reflected primarily a belief in the sanctity of the liberal imperative of economy in government, which would be promoted by both the operational and financial advantages of mercantile DEB. The accounting improvements of Deas Thomson were not those of a senior civil servant intent on protecting the interests of a privileged class with which he was closely identified but that of an individual knowledgeable in and convinced of the practice and benefits of mercantile DEB in achieving economy in government by better accountability. 
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^1	  TNA refers to The National Archives located at Kew, in London. ADM refers to documents designated in the TNA as additional manuscripts.
^2	  Hansard refers to the record of debates conducted in the British parliament.
^3	  The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography also fails to acknowledge the work of Deas Thomson either with an individual entry or in the entry for Sir John Thomas Briggs, Deas Thomson’s successor as Accountant-General of the Navy. Instead, the reader is informed that it was during Briggs’ time in office that “many and important improvements were made in the system of accounts, notably double-entry bookkeeping … Briggs made a major sustained contribution to the modernisation of naval administration” (ODNB, 2004).
^4	  John Deas Thomson’s son Edward, who had been appointed the Colonial Secretary for the colony of New South Wales in 1837, married the daughter of the Governor of the colony, Richard Bourke. Their eldest daughter married into the Grigg Family. At the time of the research for this study, the Grigg family papers were held in a private collection in Kew, London where access was provided to the authors. This access arose after the authors contacted Stephen Foster, the author of Colonial Improver: Edward Deas Thomson 1800-1879. Foster, who had been given access to the Deas Thomson papers which were then with Mrs Patsy Grigg, provided an introduction to the Grigg family who allowed the authors access to the family papers. 
^5	  The poor handling of the American War of Independence by Lord North’s Government was the catalyst which compelled Burke to confront those who were determined to perpetuate the abuses which resulted in unprecedented levels of public debt and new forms of taxation, thereby alienating the rising merchant classes who were increasingly expected to compensate for the financial failings of the government (Cannon 1969; Christie 1958; Lucas 1913; Elofson and Woods, 1996, p.486, footnote 2). According to Edmund Burke the War of Independence “presented to the people of England … a mortgage of their lands, moveables, trade, and commerce, in perpetuity, of two millions a year …” (Burke, Parliamentary History, Vol.XX, 20 June 1779, cols. 821-822).
^6	  A highly detailed program of reform was found in Burke’s “Bill for the better Regulation of His Majesty’s Civil Establishments, and of certain Public Offices; for the limitation of Pensions, and the Suppression of sundry useless, expensive, and inconvenient Places; and for applying the saved Monies thereby to the Public Service” (Parliamentary History XXI, 23 February 1780, column 111; for debate on the bill see Parliamentary History XXI, 18, 23 and 25 June 1780, columns 115,121,134,714).
^7	  The title of the Act is “An Act for appointing and enabling commissioners to examine, take, and state the public accounts of the kingdom; and to report what balances are in the hands of accountants, which may be applied to the publick service; and what defects there are in the present mode of receiving, collecting, issuing, and accounting for publick money”
^8	  The Admiralty was responsible for the military operations of the Navy while the Navy Board oversaw the Navy Office which ensured that the Navy had the operational capacity that it needed with the provision of the various services and materials essential to effective action. 
^9	  NMM refers to the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, London.
^10	  The members of the Committee were the highly influential and knowledgeable Henry Parnell (Chairman), Robert Peel, William Huskisson, George Tierney, Alexander Baring, and John Herries (TNA: T64/395). 
^11	  Despite the very public criticisms of Abbott and his proposed system of accounts, surprisingly his credibility and professional standing were not irretrievably damaged. This was confirmed by the commissions he would later receive from various government departments in regard to accounting matters. One very important supporter continued to be Parnell who, in his book On Financial Reform, confirmed his keen advocacy of the ‘mercantile system’ as recommended by Abbott (see Edwards (2001 for details of Abbott’s later career). Abbott disappeared from public life when he absconded to Brussels in 1841 with £82,196 collected in his capacity as official assignee under the English Bankruptcy Act 1831 (BPP 1850(440), p.27; for further details of these charges against Abbott see Edwards, 2001).
^12	  Like the earlier reforms of his close friend Sir James Graham, Gladstone's financial reforms from the mid-19th century by enhancing parliamentary control of Executive spending were designed to encourage economy in the public sector. This was entirely consistent with Gladstone's well known Peelite crusade or "holy war", both in the religious and prosaic sense, against profligacy in public expenditure (Gladstone to Lord John Russell, 22 July 1852, in Parker 1907, Vol.2, p.167; Gladstone to Palmerston 29 November 1861, in Guedalla 1958, p.195; Edinburgh Review, April 1857, p.561). Buxton, who had married into Gladstone's family, described Gladstone as someone whose "passion was finance and whose dream was economy" (Buxton 1901, p.25).
^13	  The term mercantile was used to refer to the commercial associations of double-entry bookkeeping, not a full accrual-based double-entry accounting system which might be used by businesses.
